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A significant number of servers that constitute the Internet are to provide private data via private
communication channels to mutually anonymous registered users. Such are the server of banks,
hospitals, that providing cloud storage and many others. Replacing communication channels by
maximally entangled states is a promising idea for the Quantum-secured Internet (QI). While it is
an important idea for large distances secure communication, for the case of the mentioned class of
servers pure entanglement based solution is not only unnecessary but also opens a threat. A crack
stimulating a node to generate secure connections via entanglement swapping between two hackers
can cause uncontrolled consumption of resources. Turning into positive a recently proven no-go
result by M. Christandl et al. [1] we propose a natural countermeasure to this threat. The solution
bases on connections between hub-nodes and end-users realized with states that contain secure key
but do not allow for swapping of this key. We then focus on the study of the quantum memory cost
of such a scheme and prove a fundamental lower bound on memory overhead. In particular, we show
that to avoid possibility of entanglement swapping, it is necessary to store at least twice as much
of memory than it is the case in standard quantum-repeater-based network design. For schemes
employing either states with positive partial transposition that approximates certain privates states
or private states hardly distinguishable from their attacked versions, we derive much tighter lower
bounds on required memory. Our considerations yield upper bounds on a two-way repeater rate
for states with positive partial transposition (PPT), which approximates strictly irreducible private
states. As a byproduct, we provide a lower bound on trace distance between PPT and private states,
shown previously only for private bits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The domain of quantum information processing, which
shows how the rules of quantum mechanics can meet the
needs of information society [2, 3], has reached its matu-
rity in recent years. We are about to enter the NISQ era
of quantum computing with the Noisy Intermediate Scale
Quantum (NISQ) devices ahead of us [4]. In parallel, a
huge effort has been done towards building the Quantum
Internet (QI) [5–7], which is predicted to be built within
several years [8]. It is viewed as a network of NISQ de-
vices with their memory and the central processing unit
(CPU), which exchange qubits rather than classical bits
between each other.
The main welcome feature of the Quantum Internet
in comparison with the traditional Internet is its, speak-
ing of theory, the inherent security of sent signals. The
1st generation QI [6] bases on the quantum correlations
called entanglement and its amazing property of tran-
sitivity. In theory, a two otherwise disconnected nodes
can obtain mutual unconditionally secure connection if
only they share maximally entangled state (singlet) with
a common node, via the entanglement swapping pro-
tocol [9, 10]. Due to the high attenuation of quantum
signals in optical fiber and impossibility of their am-
plification by cloning [11], the number of intermediate
nodes which perform entanglement swapping (quantum
repeaters [5]), needs to be large, and function in high co-
ordination. Let us note here that the quantum repeaters
protect sent qubits against eavesdropping because entan-
glement swapping uses, in fact, quantum teleportation
[10], allowing a transfer of data without any intermedi-
ate point in space-time, where it could be attacked.
The greatness of mankind, demonstrated among oth-
ers via ability to develop information-based society, is
accompanied by the weakness of its individuals due to
abuses of inventions of the latter. While the QI is about
to come, a number of serious attacks on the traditional
Internet which is working already for about a halve a cen-
tury is being more and more often reported in accordance
with growing interest in network cyber-security. One of
the simplest attack on the network is the hijacking of a
node, via malware - a malicious piece of software which
changes its functioning at a wish of a hacker. Possible
attacks on future Quantum Internet has been recently
considered [12, 13]: a piece of software infects the CPU
of a quantum device of the node of quantum repeater,
leading e.g., to local change of topology of the network.
While proposals for overcoming the implications of such
an attack are developed, we focus on a solution which to
some extent, prevents it due to laws of physics.
Hybrid Quantum Network: As it is common in quan-
tum information theory, a no-go (impossibility) in pro-
cessing of quantum data can be exploited as its potential:
quantum no-cloning led to the seminal ideas of quantum
money and quantum cryptography protocols [2, 3] while
impossibility of prediction of measurement outcomes (at-
tributing the so-called hidden variable model) led further
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2to the device independent quantum security [14, 15]. Our
countermeasure to hijacking is also based on a recently
found no-go, which can be stated as follows:
• There exist quantum states which allow for point-
to-point security of classical data against quantum
adversary, and in spite of this fact can not be ef-
fectively used in quantum key repeaters [16].
The above result shows that quantum security is not
always transitive: for certain states (call them non-
repeatable secure states σ), conversely to entanglement
swapping, when A has secure link (possessing σ) with B
and B with C, there is no possibility for B to help A and
C, via a 3-partite local quantum operations and clas-
sical communication (3-LOCC), to share a secure link,
protected against B as well. Certain bound entangled
states [17] (from which no pure entanglement can be dis-
tilled by local operations and communication [18]) and
highly noisy private states [19], has been recently shown,
to fit the scheme in case of arbitrary 3-way and one-way
classical communication (from the node B to A and C)
respectively [16, 20].
A. Main results
In this manuscript, we propose a general idea of phys-
ical protection against malware by presenting a flip side
of the presented limitation on quantum repeaters. It
amounts to deliberate use of the quantum states which
disallow for repeating of secure key, in order to protect
against any unauthorized network user who wants to per-
form it for his own purposes.
In the language of Computer Science, we propose an ar-
chitecture and model of the physical layer of the quantum
network to exclude the possibility that its local topology
is changed via attacking the network at the application
layer.
We show that specially designed hybrid quantum net-
work i.e. based on both repeaters and special relays, is
more robust against special kind of attacks than original
repeaters. We put forward a particular example of an
attack and study properties of its countermeasure. To
show the idea, we focus on a sub-network of the hybrid
quantum network, whose graph is a star, i.e. with a cen-
tral hub-node and a bunch of ∆ connected end-nodes (see
Figure 1).
Our approach suits the scenario in which:
1. The hub-node can be connected by a quantum re-
peater with other hub nodes
2. Only classical data need to be sent between the hub
node and the end-nodes.
3. The distance between the hub-node and the end-
nodes is maximally of metropolitan scale (up to
200km [21, 22]).
FIG. 1. Structure of the proposed hybrid network: green lines
connect end-users with hubs; in these, only classical data can
be transferred. Orange lines connect hubs being routing nodes
of the network; these connections allow for passing a quantum
state. Shaded lines connect two end-users that communicate
classical data. Selected region denotes single hub of our in-
terest.
4. Only disconnected hub-nodes and their two adja-
cent end-nodes are attacked at a time.
5. The Attack is honest-but curious: functioning of
the quantum CPU only is changed by malware,
while classical data at the node remain unread.
The hybrid network is shown in Fig. 3. The above ex-
ample fits the real use case, as in the network of the
traditional Internet. Indeed, there is quite a number of
nodes representing servers that deliver certain utilities in
the form of classical data, access to which is charged, and
limited to a group of registered users. Moreover, the task
of these nodes is not to connect the users, that are usu-
ally anonymous but to provide them an access to data via
private link. Servers for online banking, access to medi-
cal data, online shops, and last but not least, providers
of the data-clouds form far from a complete list of exam-
ples of the latter. In some of these cases, the users are
local so that the assumptions about the distance between
end-nodes is satisfied.
We focus on the on-line medical laboratory connected
to its clients. In this case, the data is generated in clas-
sical form (literature). The distance between the users
is usually not too big. It is also, needless to say, that
security is vital since it is important for the authors of
books, articles, etc. or the owner of the server. We also
focus on the case when two dishonest users of the net-
work hijack a single node. Their task is to obtain a free
secure connection. The main feature of our solution is
that the topology of the network is naturally, physically
protected against modification.
As it is usual, any good comes at a price. In the above
case, the price will come out in the number of qubits
needed to be stored (or processed) in quantum memory
3of a node. We provide lower bounds on the cost of our
anti-malware solution, which is related to the density of
the secure key in quantum states - a natural quantity
that, implicitly used [16, 23, 24]. To our knowledge, this
quantity has not been explicitly studied on its own so
far. More precisely, we introduce a memory overhead
as a measure of the cost. For a scheme S (that assures
security of the hub-node), its overhead is defined as
V (S) := M(S)(1−D(ρ(S))), (1)
where D is the density of the key i.e. ratio of the key
to the dimension of the state, M(S) is the total memory
of the scheme. This intuitive quantity is 0 for maximally
entangled states, as their whole memory has a form of the
key. However, in general case of mixed quantum states
V (S) is strictly larger than zero.
We then represent each link in the network by the same
state ρ and study its usefulness in the context of hack-
ing. The quality of a given scheme we quantify by the
difference between the key that can be repeated R and
the initial key of the link KD. We then say that a scheme
is (θ, η)-good when KD ≥ θ but R ≤ η. This means that
the link provides security and because it is not realized
by pure state, one can not abuse the link to connect with
someone else in the network.
We prove the general lower bound showing that for any
state serving as reasonable anti-malware scheme at least
half of the memory qubits (approximately) shall not be
used for key distillation, i.e. V (S) ≥ 12M(ρ). Different,
however asymptotically equivalent bound we obtain for
the so-called private states [19, 23]. These are states
that have two parts: the key part from which the key
can be obtained via direct von-Neumann measurement
and the shield, which just assures security of the key.
For these specific states, we prove that the shield must
be at least the size of the key part to assure the security
of the scheme. We do so by finding explicit formula for
the coherent information of a private state [25, 26].
Aiming at set of states for which there are known ex-
amples that assure an ≈ (0, 1)-good scheme, we con-
sider states that have positive partial transposition (PPT
states), and approximate some private states. More pre-
cisely, we provide lower bounds for anti-malware schemes
employing PPT states approximating strictly irreducible
private states [27]. As a related problem being of in-
dependent interest, we give upper bound on two-way re-
peater rate for PPT states (whose attacked version is sep-
arable) approximating strictly irreducible pdits for any
dimension of the key part dk. As a byproduct, we prove
a lower bound for the trace norm distance between pri-
vate states and PPT states approximating them. So far,
only dk = 2 case was known, which we also tighten. For
the considered class of states, the overhead approaches 1
in the limit of large dimensions. However, the speed of
this convergence is rather modest. It is easy to conclude
from the formulas, that e.g., for a scheme with 80% gap
i.e., where θ − η ≥ 810 , it suffices to spend 8 qubits on
Shield for one qubits in key part. States realizing such
schemes are known [23].
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section
II, we specify and describe an example of the proposed
anti-malware scheme. In Section III, we introduce the
memory overhead of the scheme and the density of key.
In subsequent Section IV, we provide lower bound on
overhead for irreducible privates states and also a gen-
eral lower. In Section V, we quantify the scheme that
uses private states hardly distinguishable from their at-
tacked versions, whereas in Section VI, we concentrate
on bounds for certain PPT states. Section VII is left for
discussion.
II. ON-LINE MEDICAL LABORATORY - THE
CASE STUDY OF THE ATTACK AND
COUNTERMEASURE
In this section we describe in detail the scenario for
which, given Quantum Internet happens to be realized in
a form suggested nowadays, an attack via malware could
be done. We then describe countermeasure invoking re-
cent results on limitations on quantum key repeaters
A. Attack on the star-shaped, pure entanglement
based quantum network.
We focus the following specific example of the above-
explained scenario. The laboratory shares secure links
with many clients Si with i ∈ {1, ..., n}, in particular
with Adam and Eve (see Fig. 2 a)). The natural topol-
ogy of the network of secure links is the star one (see Fig.
1), so that each client is connected with the medical lab-
oratory. The laboratory network node is assumed to be
a unit with classical and quantum computer inside. The
crucial observation is that if the links are quantum, and
based on pure entanglement, they allow via entanglement
swapping for the change of topology of the network. In-
deed, it can change from star to a disconnected graph of
at least two components: star without some nodes and a
pair of clients having a secure connection between them
and sharing no more the connection with the medical
laboratory.
For the above reason, setting up a star network based
on pure entanglement, the laboratory opens a possibil-
ity to provide security to pairs of clients (see Fig 2 b)).
On the other hand, states allowing quantum rather than
classical secret communication seem to be an overkill in
case where the node exchanges with subnodes inherently
classical information like in this example. Such an ad-
ditional side-effect possibility should be under control of
the medical laboratory who owns the network. A solu-
tion would be to designate a person who sells the connec-
tions. In case of no solution, there opens a possibility of
two dangers: first, the workers of the laboratory can sell
the secure links by themselves and earn illegally without
notice of the laboratory. Second, more important, two
4FIG. 2. The main idea of an attack: a) medical labo-
ratory shares entangled pairs with clients Si, in particular
with Adam and Eve. Adam and Eve can attack laboratory
via quantum malware which performs for them entanglement
swapping b) Adam and Eve share an entangled pair after suc-
cessful attack.
clients Adam and Eve can hack the system installing a
trojan quantum software, which serves them as a source
of cheap security. Even more importantly, in this way en-
ergy consumed for performing quantum operations would
be stolen, again, without notice of the medical laboratory.
Let us note that the same holds if the laboratory is one
of a number of repeater stations [5], and the links are
improved via entanglement distillation1 [10].
We will distinguish here two kinds of attacks: a gen-
eral one where the hacked node can perform any 3-party
classical communication with two other nodes and one-
way attack where only the central node can communicate
classical information to the hackers.
Remark 1. We focus on a form of honest but curious
attack aimed at misusing the power of the node. This
situation differs from an attack in which classical data of
the node are compromised.
B. Countermeasure via noisy entangled states.
In what follows we observe, that using appropriate
noisy entangled states solves the mentioned problem in
cases of general (two-way) and one-way attack (see Fig.
3).
1Note that there are other services that has the same feature, yet
we focus on the case of medical laboratory. Another one could be a
clinic performing blood tests shares the same properties: the user
is an end-user, the data are classical, and should be kept private.
Recently a fundamental result has been shown in this
context, indicating that for some states (having at least
one separable key attacked state) the rate R of repeated
secure key is strongly related to the so called distillable
entanglement [10, 18, 20] by the following result:
RA←H→E(γAH1 , γH2E) ≤ EA←H→ED (γAH1 ⊗γH2E), (2)
where → stands for the classical communication re-
stricted to one-way from the intermediate node H ≡
H1H2 to nodes A and E, and γAHi denotes a private
state [19] - a state possessing ideal security directly ac-
cessible via measuring its subsystem called key part.
Notation 1. Private state with dk dimensional key part,
and ds dimensional shield part per one party, shared be-
tween A or B and H is denoted γdk,ds .
Notation 2.
EA←H→ED (ρ) ≡ E→D (ρ), (3)
EA↔H↔ED (ρ) ≡ ED(ρ). (4)
We present the following countermeasure: instead of
having a star network with the clients, which is pure en-
tanglement based, the medical laboratory can set a star-
shaped network of point-to-point links based on bound
entangled states which are approximate private states
(see Fig 3). Let us note that this is legitimate when the
laboratory needs to encrypt only classical data. Further-
more, if clients had a quantum connection with the med-
ical laboratory, then we could have a case of laboratory’s
network abuse. Due to the fact that these bound entan-
gled states are not transitive there simply does not exist
a quantum software, or even a quantum tripartite LOCC
protocol between Adam, Eve and the quantum computer
of the laboratory which manages secure communication
with it to achieve this task. The no-go is hence turned
into a success. The medical laboratory employing the
bound entanglement based quantum links keeps secure
communication but needs not to control the setup. There
is simply no possibility for the setup to be forced to create
a secure link with a non-negligible amount of secrecy.
Let us note that although we talk here about entan-
glement swapping, in [1] it is shown that even if the links
with the medical laboratory are provided in the form
of γ⊗nAHi , the rate of the output secure key for Adam
and Eve is negligible as a function of dimension of the
bound entangled approximate private states. By neg-
ligible amount, we mean the rate which goes to zero
with growing dimension of the shield system of the pri-
vate state γAHi . Hence the countermeasure works in the
asymptotic regime up to the fact that some small rate
of key can be obtained by Adam and Eve. Yet, the key
is only classical, it is clearly not in the form of pure en-
tanglement, as the initial states shared by Adam with
the laboratory and Eve with the laboratory were bound
entangled and had to remain so after any LOCC imple-
mentable quantum malware.
5FIG. 3. The main idea of the countermeasure: a) Medical lab-
oratory shares bound entangled states with clients Si, (each
having at least 1 bit of key), in particular with Adam and
Eve. There does not exist an attack on laboratory’s quantum
computer via LOCC quantum malware which swaps the key
b) Adam and Eve can not share a state with non-negligible
amount of key (compare [1]).
III. MEMORY OVERHEAD OF THE
COUNTERMEASURE
We now focus on the quantum memory cost of imple-
mentation of the proposed countermeasure. We recall
first the definition of the key repeater rate. Let us stress
here that according to our approach, the lower it is, the
better for the security of the node.
We further focus on the scheme represented by a pri-
vate state with dk dimensional key-part and ds dimen-
sional shield. This state reads a form [19]
Definition 1. Private quantum state
γdk,ds :=
dk−1∑
i,j=0
1
dk
|ii〉〈jj| ⊗Xij , (5)
where Xij = UiσU
†
j for some state σ of Cds ⊗Cds and Ui
are some unitary transformations.
Notation 3. We follow the notation in which,
||X||1 = Tr
√
XX†. (6)
Additionally we skip the subscript, as it doesn’t lead to
any ambiguity.
Remark 2. Through the rest of the paper, we assume
that each considered quantum state ρ acts on HH ⊗HN
being tensor product of subspaces associated with the hub
and a node, and dimHH = dimHN <∞. What is more,
both subspaces are assumed to be partitioned into key and
shield parts (of dimensions dk and ds respectively) in the
same way at both sides.
Notation 4. Here we adapt shortened notation in which
Xij ≡ Xii,jj. In calculations we mainly incorporate full
notation, which doesn’t lead to any ambiguities. Addi-
tionally for i 6= j we define Xij,ij ≡ 0, as they do not
enter to definition of a private state.
Note that Xii are, in fact, subnormalized states, obtained
on the shield system upon observing key |i〉 on the key
part. We call them conditional states. According to def-
inition, KD(γdk,ds) ≥ log dk, while in case of equality, a
private state is called irreducible: its whole secure content
is available from the key part via direct measurement. In
the case in which Xii are additionally separable, we call
these states strictly irreducible private states. In fact, it
is conjectured that all irreducible private states are of the
form of strictly irreducible ones [27], it is so if there do
not exist entangled but key undistillable states.
Definition 2. The distillable key rate with respect to ar-
bitrary LOCC operations is defined as:
KD(ρ) := inf>0 lim supn→∞ (7)
supΛLOCCn ,γdk,ds
{
log dk
n : Λ
LOCC
n (ρ
⊗n) ≈ γdk,ds
}
, (8)
where ρ is a bipartite state shared by the parties. Λ is a
LOCC protocol with two-way classical communication.
Definition 3. The quantum key repeater rate with re-
spect to arbitrary LOCC operations among A, E and H
is defined as:
RA↔H↔E(ρ, ρ′) := lim
→0
lim
n→∞ (9)
sup
ΛLOCCn ,γdk,ds
{
log dk
n
: TrHΛ
LOCC
n ((ρ⊗ ρ′)⊗n) ≈ γdk,ds
}
,
(10)
where Adam and Hub share state ρ while Hub and Eve
share ρ′. Λ :=
{
ΛLOCCn
}
are tripartite LOCC protocols
with two-way classical communication. In the case in
which communication between central node and A,E sys-
tems is restricted to one-way from H to A and E, we
denote this rate with RA←H→ED .
Notation 5. For the repeater rate in the case in which
ρ = ρ′, we introduce simplified notation R→(↔)(ρ).
An ultimate goal would be to provide a non-repeatable
key with the smallest possible memory cost. Our solu-
tion to the problem is represented by a bipartite quantum
state ρ shared between the central node H and one of the
clients (Adam), however, its specific parameters are im-
portant enough to write them out explicitly. The scheme
will be represented by the following tuple:
S→(↔)(ρ) := 〈ρ, log dimH(ρ),∆(S),KD(ρ), R→(↔)(ρ)〉.
(11)
6The arrow(s) in the superscript are dropped if the results
hold for both cases. The state ρHA is shared between the
central node H and a single client (Adam). ∆(S) is the
degree of the node (number of connections).
Definition 4. We say that the scheme is one-way (two-
way) (θ, η)-good if R→(↔)(ρ) ≤  and KD(ρ) ≥ η.
In our approach, we are interested in possibly large gap
betweenKD and R
→(↔), while keeping memory overhead
considerably small at the same time. We quantify this
gap by its lower bound defined as η − θ.
Definition 5. By an overhead of the scheme we mean
the following quantity:
V (S) := ∆(S)(log dimH(ρ)−KD(ρ)). (12)
Where ρ is a bipartite state shared between the hub and
a client.
The overhead is the difference between the qubits of
memory at the node: ρ⊗∆(S) has
M(ρ) := ∆(S) log dimH(ρ) (13)
of qubits of subsystem H, and the number of bits of se-
curity which the node shares with the other part of the
Quantum Internet.
Definition 6. For an antimalware scheme that is (θ, η)-
good, we call the difference η − θ the gap of the scheme.
We note here that such defined overhead bares strong
connection with the other, to our knowledge not explic-
itly studied notion, which is that of density of private
key.
Definition 7. For a quantum state ρ shared between the
hub H and Adam A or Eve E, we define density of the
private key D as:
D(ρ) := KD(ρ)
log dimH(ρ)
. (14)
We then have the dependence:
V (S) = M(ρ)(1−D(ρ)). (15)
From the above form it is clear to see that the overhead is
a non-negative number, as the density is a quantity less
than or equal to 1. In what follows we provide several
lower bounds on the overhead V of the countermeasure,
that satisfies
0 ≤ V (S). (16)
The above inequality follows from the fact that secure key
KD(ρ), can not be larger than memory size log dimH(ρ),
and hence ∆(S) is non-negative.
IV. LOWER BOUNDS ON THE OVERHEAD OF THE
ANTI-MALWARE SCHEME
Let us first focus on the class of one-way attacks: the
attacked hub node can send data to two receiver nodes
owned by malicious parties that can communicate freely.
We begin with preliminary definitions and facts.
Definition 8. The coherent information of a quantum
state ρAB
Icoh(A〉B) = S(B)− S(AB), (17)
where S(B) is the Von Neumann entropy of state ρB =
TrA(ρAB) and S(AB) is that of state the ρAB.
It is clear, that the key repeater rate is an upper bound
on distillable entanglement. We therefore provide a lower
bound on one-way distillable entanglement of a private
state, via the Devetak-Winter hashing protocol [28].
E→D (γdk,ds) ≥ log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
Icoh(A
′〉B′)σi , (18)
where Icoh is the coherent information [18], and σi are
the conditional states of a private state. We have then
the following observation
Observation 1. For any private state γdk,ds , one-way
distillable entanglement is lower bounded.
E→D (γdk,ds) ≥ log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
Icoh(A
′〉B′)σi , (19)
where σi are conditional states UiρA′B′U
†
i .
Let us note that the above bound is achievable given a
choice ∀iσi = Ids , i.e. for pdits with twisted-in maximally
mixed state.
Since coherent information can not be smaller than
− log d for a d dimensional state, we have the following
general result.
Corollary 1. For any private state γdk,ds one-way dis-
tillable entanglement is lower bounded by the following
expression.
E→D (γdk,ds) ≥ log dk − log ds,
where dk and ds, are dimensions of the key part and
shield part respectively.
Proof. It follows from the fact that for any state σi of
dimension d2s there is: Icoh(A
′〉B′)σi ≥ − log ds. Indeed,
S(B′) − S(A′B′) = I(A′ : B′) − S(A′) ≥ 0 − log |A′| =
− log ds, as the entropy is maximally log |A′| while I(A′ :
B′) ≥ 0. uunionsq
7Following the fact that one-way distillable entangle-
ment constitutes a lower bound for both one-way and
two-way repeater rates, we conclude that in schemes in-
corporating privates states, it is reasonable to assume
ds ≥ dk. This assumption is a necessary condition for
having low repeater rates.
As we have discussed, we obtain the following lower
bound on overhead of schemes based on irreducible pri-
vate states:
Theorem 1. If an irreducible private state γdk,ds serves
as an (θ, log dk)-good anti-malware scheme S
→
γdk,ds
with
degree ∆(S→γdk,ds ), then its overhead satisfies a lower
bound:
V (S→γdk,ds ) ≥ ∆(S
→
γ ) log(dkds)
(
1− 1
2− θlog dk
)
(20)
≈θ≈0 12M(γdk,ds). (21)
Proof can be found in appendix.
The above theorem shows that memory used by a
private state which allows only for θ of repeated key
must have at least as big shield system as its key part.
The technique used for proving Theorem 1 inspires
to find a general lower bound on the overhead of any
scheme, which is presented below.
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FIG. 4. Plots of lower bounds on percentage of memory over-
head from Theorem 1, with different values of dk.
Theorem 2. Any state ρ that serves as (θ, η)-good anti-
malware scheme, satisfies
V (S) ≥M(ρ)
(
1
2
− θ
log dH
)
≈θ≈0 1
2
M(ρ). (22)
The proof is left for the appendix. The above theo-
rem is based on observation that distillable key is upper
bounded by S(A)/2 if only coherent information is non-
positive. As we will show below on Fig. 5, this bound is
the only bound on key repeater rate for certain amount of
one-way distillable entanglement, as we comment below.
FIG. 5. Upper bounds on quantum key repeater rates. Blue:
introduced here in eqn. (23), orange: special case for Icoh = 0,
violet: [16], and green: only for some states [20]. (Color
online).
Shown in Figure (5) as blue line segment:
R→(ρ) ≤ R↔(ρ) ≤ KD(ρ)
≤ Esq(ρ) ≤ S(A)
2
+
E→D (ρ)
2
. (23)
The inequality in Eq. (23) is a known fact, since one-way
communication from the hub H to hosts A and E can not
allow to repeat more key than in two-way communication
setup. The second inequality comes from the fact that
it is not possible to have more of a repeatable key than
a distillable key. On the other hand, it is possible that
the quantum key repeater rate is smaller than the distil-
lable key of a particular state ρ. The third inequality is
true because squashed entanglement is an upper bound
on distillable key [29]. Finally, the last inequality is the
upper bound on R→ observed in this work, which is a
direct consequence from the proof of lemma 18 in [16].
Similar results on private capacity for quantum channels
were obtained in [30]. We find our approach and defini-
tions simplified, as they consider only channels.
The green line segment is the upper bound on quantum
key repeater rate derived in [20]:
R→(ρ) ≤ 2E→D (ρ). (24)
Here the hub can send messages to Adam and Eve, but
not receive from them. Adam and Eve can communicate
in both ways freely.
The violet line segment is the upper bound introduced
in [16]:
R→(ρ) ≤ E
→
D (ρ)
2
+
EC(ρ)
2
. (25)
8In this case only the communication from Hub to Adam
is one-way and between Hub and Eve the communication
is two-way, no other data transfer is allowed.
The orange line segment is the upper bound for states
that have Icoh = 0. These states do not have more of
distillable key than EC/2 or S(A)/2.
Even though green and violet bounds intersect in
E→D = Ec/3, they are different scenarios in which the
classical communication is not in the same direction.
Therefore, they are incomparable. It is the same for blue
and violet bounds. On the other hand, the directions of
classical communication for green and blue bounds are
the same, so it is possible to compare them. The upper
bound introduced in this work is more accurate than the
bound derived in [20] starting from E→D = S(A)/3.
V. LOWER BOUND ON OVERHEAD FOR
PRIVATE STATES HARDLY DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THEIR ATTACKED VERSIONS
In this Section, we derive lower bounds for the memory
overhead for schemes utilizing private states hardly dis-
tinguishable from their attacked versions. We first briefly
explain the approach and then formalize the presented
idea.
Let us note, that to assure η > 0 in antimalware
scheme, we need to know how much a given state of it has
distillable key. A good choice is then a strictly irreducible
private state, as for it, we know that KD(γ〈dk,ds〉) =
log dk, however, such γ〈dk,ds〉 should not be too much
distillable, as R↔ ≥ ED(ρ). Thus to also have that
scheme is (θ, η)-good for small θ, we need to assure
ED(γdk,ds) ≤ θ. This can be done in various ways, in-
cluding bound ED(ρ) ≤ − log
∥∥ρΓ∥∥ [31]. From [20] it
follows, that with a factor 2, this will imply that R→
is small since it is upper bounded by 2E→D . The next
theorem encapsulates this approach and proves the lower
bound of the memory cost of such a solution.
We first use the bound that employs measure called
log-negativity [32, 33].
Observation 2. For a private state such that Xii ∈
PPT , and at least one from its conditional key attacked
states is separable there hold the following bounds on the
one-way quantum key repeater rate:
E→D (γdk,ds ⊗ γdk,ds) ≤ 2 log
(
1 +
∥∥γΓdk,ds − γˆΓds,dk∥∥),
(26)
where γˆdk,ds =
∑
i
1
dk
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗Xii is an irreducible pri-
vate state after measurement on the key part (attaacked),
and Γ is an operation of partial transposition.
Proof can be found in appendix.
For technical reasons, we deal more specifically with
the right-hand side of the above inequality, as encapsu-
lated in the following observation.
Observation 3. The following identity holds.∥∥γΓdk,ds − γˆΓdk,ds∥∥ = ∑
i 6=j
1
dk
∥∥XΓij∥∥, (27)
where γˆΓdk,ds =
∑
i
1
dk
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗ XΓii is the private state
after measurement on the key part and Γ is the partial
transpose operation.
Proof can be found in appendix.
In the next lemma, we argue, that some private states,
that are hardily distinguishable from their attacked ver-
sions, have large dimension of the shield in relation to
the dimension of the key part.
Lemma 1. For a special private state γdk,ds , which sat-
isfies condition XΓii ≥ 0, and ||γΓdk,ds − γˆΓdk,ds || ≤  there
is:
ds ≥ dk − 1

. (28)
Proof can be found in appendix.
The above technical lemmas and observations lead us
to the main result of this section. It states, that the
overhead in case of private states that are hardly distin-
guishable from their attacked versions.
Theorem 3. A strictly irreducible private state γ〈dk,ds〉
(Xii ∈ SEP, dk ≥ 2) satisfying
∥∥∥γΓ〈dk,ds〉 − γˆΓ〈dk,ds〉∥∥∥ ≤
 and dk−1ds ≤  serves as (θ, η)-good anti malware scheme
with:
V (S→γ〈dk,ds〉
) ≥M (γ〈dk,ds〉)(1− log dklog dk+log dk−1
)
(29)
≈=0 M(γ〈dk,ds〉), (30)
for θ = 2 log (1 + ) ≈1 2ln 2, and η = log dk.
Proof can be found in appendix.
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FIG. 6. Plots of lower bounds on percentage of memory over-
head from Theorem 3, with different values of dk.
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FIG. 7. Plots of lower bound on gap between η and θ for the
scheme in Theorem 3.
Example of the gap for low dimensional state
In general, one would like to diminish the repeater rate
of the scheme as much as possible. Unfortunately, in The-
orem 3, the parameter  appears both in formula for the
repeater rate and the overhead. This is the reason why
one can not reduce repeater rate to zero keeping the over-
head smaller than total memory cost. In this situation,
one should decide on an acceptable level of repeater rate,
for which the overhead is still reasonable. A small di-
mensional example of a pbit state which allows for such
a control is known [19, 34]. Block matrix representation
of such a pbit is:
Ωds =
1
2

I
d2s
0 0 Fd2s
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
F
d2s
0 0 Id2s
 , (31)
where F is a matrix of swap quantum logic gate of di-
mension d2s implying
∥∥∥ΩΓds − ΩˆΓds∥∥∥ = 1ds . We estimate
now the size of the gap for a scheme using this state.
Let us assume a scheme with minimal amount of mem-
ory by setting  = 1ds (see that conditions of Lemma 1
and Theorem 3 are satisfied). We obtain a lower bound
V (Sγ〈dk,ds〉) ≥M(γ〈dk,ds〉)
(
1− 11+log ds
)
, for scheme be-
ing
(
2
ln 2
1
ds
, 1
)
-good. For ds = 2 it saturates also the
general lower bound on overhead from Theorem 2 with
value of 12 , although in this case the rate of repeater R
→
is upper bounded with 1ln 2 ≈ 1.44, what is an unsat-
isfying result. The first nontrivial case, in that anti-
malware scheme has an advantage over malicious par-
ties, appears for ds = 3, in which repeatable rate drops
to R→ ≤ 23 ln 2 ≈ 0.96 being strictly smaller than key rate
K = 1, what follows from its irreducibly.
VI. LOWER BOUNDS ON OVERHEAD FOR
PPT STATES
As was argued in [16] (see supplemental material note
6) the states which are PPT and approximate private bits
are of rather high dimension. This fact can be found as
a result of the following earlier statement [24] (see also
[35]):
∀ρ∈PPTγ∈C2⊗C2⊗Cds⊗Cds ||ρ− γ2,ds || ≥
1
2(ds + 1)
, (32)
We conclude that a quantum PPT state close by  in
trace norm to strictly irreducible private state γdk,ds has
dimension of the shield at least ds ≥ 1−22 .
We know that for two-way repeater rate to be zero, the
state has to be bound entangled (R↔(ρ) ≥ ED(ρ)) [19].
Thus, in this Section, we investigate the overhead using
such schemes.
Notation 6. We adopt a notation in which PPT state
ρ has the following form:
ρ :=
dk−1∑
i,j,k,l=0
|ij〉 〈kl| ⊗Aij,kl. (33)
Where Aij,kl are blocks of dimension d
2
s.
Proposition 1. If ρ is a state with positive partial trans-
pose, that approximates a strictly irreducible private bit
||ρ − γ〈2,ds〉|| ≤  for  ≥ 12(ds+1) ,
∥∥AΓ01,10∥∥ ≤ ,and its
conditional shield states are separable, then its two-way
repeater rate R↔(ρ) is upper bounded.
R↔(ρ) ≤ 2
(√
+
3
2

)
(1 + log ds) (34)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 3
)
h(
2
√
+ 3
1 + 2
√
+ 3
). (35)
Proof can be found in appendix.
Indeed PPT states from Proposition 1 above do exist.
One example can be states for which A01,10 = A
Γ
00,11.
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FIG. 8. Upper bounds on repeater rate from Proposition 1.
Domains are constrained with  ≥ 1
2(ds+1)
condition.
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Theorem 4. If a state with positive partial trans-
pose ρ approximates strictly irreducible private bit ||ρ −
γ〈2,ds〉|| ≤  for 12(ds+1) ≤  < 12 ,
∥∥AΓ01,10∥∥ ≤ , and its
conditional shield states are separable, then it serves as a
two-way (θ, η)-good anti-malware scheme Sρ with degree
∆(Sρ), then its overhead satisfies a lower bound:
V (Sρ) ≥M(ρ)
(
1− 1+(1+

2 )h(

2
1+ 
2
)
1+log( 1−22 )
− 2
)
(36)
with η = 1 − 8 − 4h() (where h(.) is the binary
Shannon entropy), and θ = 2
(√
+ 32
)
(1 + log ds) +
(1 + 2
√
+ 3)h( 2
√
+3
1+2
√
+3
).
Proof can be found in appendix. From inequality (32)
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FIG. 9. Plot of lower bound on percentage of memory over-
head from Theorem 4.
ds=512
ds=1024
ds=2048
ds=4096
ds=8192
ds=16384
0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010
ϵ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
bits
Lower bound on rates gap from Theorem 4
FIG. 10. Plots of lower bounds on gap between η and θ for
the scheme in Theorem 4. The case ds = 64 is a setting with
lowest dimension for obtaining positive lower bound on gap
under  ≥ 1
2(ds+1)
condition.
we obtain
log ds ≥ log
(
1− 2
2
)
. (37)
We then see that focusing on states which have posi-
tive partial transposition and approximate private bits is
quite costly: the overhead approximates the whole mem-
ory of the scheme for small . In particular, obtaining a
reasonable amount of key in links ≈ 1 bits for each of ∆
links implies that the whole memory cost is that of an
overhead. However, an advantage of this scheme is that it
is no longer limited to one-way communication. In this
case, there does not exist any 3-partite LOCC protocol
which can break the scheme.
We now generalize the above result for larger dimen-
sions of the key part than qubit, and study it in case
of private state. Ideas for proving both are similar and
quite clear in case of private states instead of their ap-
proximations, so we begin describing the latter result.
We define the cost of the countermeasure as lower
bound on the number of qubits necessary for the shield
part ds of the private state used in the protection scheme.
We will need a numer of technical observations and
lemmas, which we present below.
Observation 4. Denoting with Aij,kl matrices some of
them (Aii,jj) being unnormalized conditional states of the
shield of a state ρ =
∑
ijkl |ij〉 〈kl| ⊗Aij,kl, we prove the
following relations:
‖ρ− γ‖ ≤  =⇒ ∀i 6=j‖Aii,jj‖ ≥ 1
dk
− , (38)
and
‖ρ− γ‖ ≤  =⇒
∑
i6=j
‖Aij,ij‖ ≤ . (39)
In the following lemma and subsequent corollary, we
prove a general lower bound on the distance between pri-
vate states (of any dimension of the key part) from PPT
states [24].
Lemma 2. For any state ρ ∈ PPT , there is
||ρ− γdk,ds || ≤ ⇒ ds ≥
(
dk − 1

)
(1− dk), (40)
where γ is a private state with d2k dimensional key part
and d2s dimensional shield subsystem.
Corollary 2. For any state ρ ∈ PPT approximating
private state, the following lower bound holds
||ρ− γdk,ds || ≥
dk − 1
ds + dk (dk − 1) . (41)
The important properties of lower bound presented in
Corollary 2 are the fact that it is not trivial for values of
dk but also that it yields tighter bound for dk = 2 known
form [24] (see eqn. 32). Concluding as a byproduct, we
have found a non-trivial (non-zero) lower bound on the
distance between any private state and a PPT state in
any dimension [24, 34].
Corollary 3. For any state ρ ∈ PPT of dimension 2ds
approximating private bit there is:
||ρ− γdk,ds || ≤ ⇒
∥∥AΓ01,10∥∥ ≤ 2 . (42)
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The upper bound on norm in Corollary 3 is tighter
than the one in [24]. This is due to slightly differ-
ent proving technique. This motivates us to assume∑
i 6=j
∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤ , instead of 2∑i 6=j ∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤  what
would be analogous to assumption in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. If ρ is a state with positive partial trans-
pose approximates a strictly irreducible private dit (pdit)
||ρ−γ〈dk,ds〉|| ≤  for dk−1ds+dk(dk−1) ≤ ,
∑
i 6=j
∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤ ,
and conditional shield states of ρ are separable, then its
two-way repeater rate R↔(ρ) is upper bounded as follows
R↔(ρ) ≤ 2 (√+ ) log dimH(ρ) (43)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 2
)
h(
√
+ 
1
2 +
√
+ 
). (44)
Proof can be found in appendix.
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FIG. 11. Upper bounds on repeater rate from Proposition 2.
We extract from condition dk−1
ds+dk(dk−1) ≤  minimal value of
ds = d dk−1−dk(dk−1) e yielding best value for upper bound.
It is easy to notice that the upper bound in Proposition
2 evaluated for pbits is tighter than the corresponding
one from Proposition 1. This is because with slightly
different assumption for Aij,ji blocks.
Theorem 5. If a state with positive partial transpose ρ
approximates strictly irreducible private dit (pdit) ||ρ −
γ〈dk,ds〉|| ≤  for dk−1ds+dk(dk−1) ≤  < 1dk ,
∑
i 6=j
∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤
, and its conditional shield states are separable, then it
serves as a two-way (θ, η)-good anti-malware scheme Sρ
with degree ∆(Sρ), and its overhead is lower bounded with
V (Sρ) ≥M(ρ)
(
1− 
2
− f(dk, )
)
, (45)
f(dk, ) :=
log dk + (1 +

2 )h(

2
1+ 2
)
log dk + log
(
dk−1

)
+ log(1− dk)
, (46)
with η = log dk−8 log dk−4h() (where h(.) is the binary
Shannon entropy), and
θ = 2 (
√
+ ) log dimH(ρ) + (1 + 2
√
+ 2)h(
√
+
1
2 +
√
+
).
We leave the proof for the appendix.
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FIG. 12. Plots of lower bound on percentage of memory over-
head from Theorem 5, with different values of dk.
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FIG. 13. Plots of lower bounds on gap between η and θ for the
scheme in Theorem 5. For obtaining possibly optimal value of
upper bounds we attribute with ds its minimal possible value
of ds = d dk−1−dk(dk−1) e.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript, we have observed a particular at-
tack on quantum network, and studied the quantum
memory cost of its remedy - the hybrid quantum network.
A common approach in designing Quantum-secured In-
ternet is to connect its nodes via pure entangled states
or channels that distribute such entanglement. In this
article, we observe that this practice is not needed for a
number of nodes of the Internet, and moreover, would
open a threat.
As a case study of such a threat, we consider the possi-
bility of performing entanglement swapping between the
data basis of the medical laboratory and its two clients
Adam and Eve. We imagine here that in future quan-
tum technologies the link between each of them and the
medical laboratory would be quantum one. As a coun-
termeasure, we propose to replace these links into those
sharing/distributing bound entangled states which ap-
proximate private states. As for clients being the end-
users, it is enough to communicate only classical infor-
mation (blood tests etc.) with the medical laboratory;
a functionality to pass a quantum state seems not only
to be a redundant feature but also opens a gateway for
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possible abuse.
While in the case of a maximally entangled state, one
can generate 1 bit of key per 1 qubit of local memory,
this is not the case for mixed entangled quantum states.
We, therefore, study the memory cost of the proposed
solution. We have introduced two notions: (i) that of a
scheme (a choice of states shared by the node and users),
and (ii) that of the memory overhead. The latter quan-
tity reports how many qubits of the memory are not di-
rectly used up to generate key, but only assures security
of its generation. We then focus on schemes that are rep-
resented by a single quantum state distributed in all the
links. As the quality of the scheme, we propose the gap
between the key from the state and the upper bound on
the key that can be obtained via hacking. We called it a
gap of the scheme.
We first focus on what is more or less straightforward
to obtain from the well-established facts in entanglement-
based approach to quantum cryptography. This leads
us to two different but asymptotically equivalent lower
bounds for the memory overhead of the scheme. One is
for private states, and the other for all quantum states.
It implies that at least half of the memory of the scheme
need to assist security of the scheme rather than can be
turned to security itself.
We then consider particular bound entangled states as
well as private states for which we know the construc-
tion of our proposal can be based. These are PPT sates
that approximate private states and that are at the same
time highly indistinguishable by PPT operations from
their attacked versions, which are separable. Although,
in general, the overhead, in that case, is asymptotically
1, the convergence to 1 is modest. The presented results
allow to tune the exemplary states to the size of the gap
of the scheme. As a byproduct, we have both sharpen
the lower bounds on the distance between PPT and pri-
vate bits and gave the first lower bound on this distance
between PPT states and private dits for arbitrary d. It
would be then interesting to find the schemes based on
private dits, rather than those that are based on tensor
products of private bits.
Let us note here that we consider the attack to be
honest-but curious i.e., we haven’t discussed so far the
security of the data at the node. Both in the case of
quantum repeater and the proposed hybrid repeater, the
nodes can be hijacked, and in principle, the data can
be traded via blackmail, and therefore, should be kept
e.g., post-quantumly encrypted. However, in the hybrid
repeater, an honest but curious attack using the power of
the node for free quantum Internet can not be anymore
used.
Finally, we admit, that another simple to consider so-
lution for the considered threat, is to live with the fact of
possibility of a malware and let every registered user of
a node be connected with any other by quantum switch
(no matter what is the type of the node) and sold e.g.
utility. This, however, would need to be done at a certain
price, in similarity to a utility that any smartphone can
be turned into a network router within the price of the
subscription. In general, one can ask for any other non-
transitive property (non-hackable), that can be incorpo-
rated to provide security. That will be studied elsewhere
[36].
While large effort to make QI happen is begin taken [8],
it is also important to know a novel, inherently quantum
threats That can come from the new quantum network
design. To our knowledge this direction of research needs
separate attention, as has not been studied in deep so far
[12, 13].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Observation 1.
E→D (γdk,ds) ≥ Icoh (AA′〉BB′)γdk,ds (47)
= S(BB′)γdk,ds − S(AA′BB′)γdk,ds (48)
= log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
S(σiB′)− S(ρA′B′) (49)
= log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
[
S(TrA′ UiρA′B′U
†
i )− S(UiρA′B′U†i )
]
(50)
= log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
[S(B′)− S(A′B′)][UiρA′B′U†i ] (51)
= log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
Icoh(A
′〉B′)[UiρA′B′U†i ] (52)
= log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
Icoh(A
′〉B′)σi , (53)
where σiB′ = TrA′ UiρA′B′U
†
i .
The first inequality is due to the fact that one-way
distillable entanglement is lower bounded by the co-
herent information. The first equality follows from
direct calculation, and the fact that S(
∑
i
1
dk
|i〉〈i| ⊗
TrA′UiρA′B′U
†
i ) = log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
S(TrA′UiρA′B′U
†
i ).
Equality S(AA′BB′) = S(ρA′B′) comes from the con-
struction: the private state is unitarily equivalent to
ψ ⊗ ρ (where ψ is maximally entangled state of dimen-
sion d2k), and the entropy is invariant under unitary
transformation, additive and zero for pure states. In
the equality (50) we add the unitary transformations to
ρA′B′ which is assured by mentioned property of entropy:
S(ρA′B′) =
∑
i
1
dk
S(UiρA′B′U
†
i ). We then finally observe
that the averaged is the coherent information, yet evalu-
ated on a state σi ≡ UiρA′B′U†i . uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. Below we present a sequence of
inequalities, that altogether allow to prove the theorem.
θ ≥ R→(γdk,ds) ≥ E→D (γdk,ds) ≥
log dk +
∑
i
1
dk
Icoh(A
′〉B′)σi ≥ log dk − log ds, (54)
14
The first inequality comes from our assumption that
γdk,ds is an (θ, log dk)-good one-way anti-malware
scheme. The second inequality is supported by the fact,
that one can distill R→(ρ) singlets and use them for tele-
portation. One of methods to repeat key is to distill E→D
of pure entanglement between H and A and H and B
respectively. This is followed by entanglement swapping
[37]. The third inequality comes from Eq. (18). The
final inequality is due to Corollary 1.
Thanks to the above inequality we can upper bound
the density of private key as follows:
D(γdk,ds) =
log dk
log dimH
=
log dk
log dk + log ds
(55)
≤ log dk
2 log dk − θ =
1
2− θlogdk
. (56)
From Eq. (15) we have
V (S) ≥M(γ)(1− 1
2− θlog dk
) (57)
≈M(γdk,ds)
(
1
2
− θ
4 log dk
+O(θ2)
)
≈θ≈0 1
2
M(γdk,ds),
(58)
what ends the proof. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 2. Because θ ≥ R↔(ρ) ≥ ED(ρ) ≥
Icoh(H〉A), and it has non-positive coherent information
Icoh(H〉A) [28], thus distillable key has to fulfill:
KD(ρ) ≤ Esq(ρ) ≤ 1
2
I(ρ) =
1
2
S(H) +
1
2
Icoh(H〉A) ≤
1
2
(log dk + log ds) + θ, (59)
where Esq(ρA,B) = infρABE∈SExt
1
2I(A;B|E) is the
squashed entanglement [38], and the next inequality is by
the definition of Esq. Owing to the fact that KD(ρ) ≥ η,
we obtain:
η ≤ 1
2
(log dk + log ds) + θ, (60)
D(ρ) ≤ η
log dH
≤
1
2 log dH + θ
log dH
=
1
2
+
θ
log dH
, (61)
V (S) ≥M(ρ)(1
2
− θ
log dH
) ≈θ≈0 1
2
M(ρ). (62)
uunionsq
Proof of Observation 2. The first inequality comes
from the result of Christandl and Ferrara [20] there is:
R→(γ) ≤ E→D (γ ⊗ γ). (63)
The distillable entanglement is upper bounded by the
log-negativity:
E→D (γ ⊗ γ) ≤ log
∥∥γΓ ⊗ γΓ∥∥ = 2 log ∥∥γΓ∥∥, (64)
where equality comes from the additivity of the log-
negativity. We upper bound log-negativity as follows.
∥∥γΓ∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1dk
∑
ij
|ij〉 〈ji| ⊗XΓij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (65)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1dk
∑
i
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗XΓii +
1
dk
∑
i 6=j
|ij〉 〈ji| ⊗XΓij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (66)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1dk ∑i |ii〉 〈ii| ⊗XΓii
∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1dk
∑
i6=j
|ij〉 〈ji| ⊗XΓij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (67)
=1 +
∥∥γΓ − γˆΓ∥∥. (68)
The last equality is obtained via Xii ∈ PPT . Fi-
nally, because logarithm is strictly increasing, we have
2 log
∥∥γΓ∥∥ ≤ 2 log (1 + ∥∥γΓ − γˆΓ∥∥), and hence:
E→D (γ ⊗ γ) ≤ 2 log
(
1 +
∥∥γΓ − γˆΓ∥∥). (69)
What implies in the virtue of equation (63):
R→(γ) ≤ 2 log (1 + ∥∥γΓ − γˆΓ∥∥). (70)
uunionsq
Proof of Observation 3. By direct calculations we
have:∥∥γΓ − γˆΓ∥∥ (71)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i,j
1
dk
|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗XΓij −
∑
i
1
dk
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗XΓii
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (72)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i 6=j
1
dk
|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗XΓij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (73)
=
∑
i 6=j
1
dk
∥∥XΓij∥∥. (74)
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 1. A pdit γdk,ds has d
2
k − dk off-
diagonal block elements Xij , and ‖Xij‖ ≥ 0. From
Observation 3 we have that
∑
i 6=j
1
dk
∥∥XΓij∥∥ ≤ , for
some small  ≥
∥∥∥γΓdk,ds − γˆΓdk,ds∥∥∥. Then among those
block elements there clearly has to be one such that
1
dk
∥∥XΓi0,j0∥∥ ≤ d2k−dk as a property of mean value, hence:∥∥XΓi0,j0∥∥ ≤ dkd2k − dk = dk − 1 . (75)
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We know from [39], that ‖Xij‖ ≤ ds
∥∥XΓij∥∥. Hence, for
arbitrary (i, j) we have:
ds
∥∥XΓij∥∥ ≥ ‖Xij‖ = ∥∥∥UiσU†j ∥∥∥ = ‖σ‖ = 1. (76)
In particular 1 ≤ ds
∥∥XΓi0,j0∥∥. Then 1 ≤ ds dk−1 and
finally ds ≥ dk−1 uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3. From Observation 2:
R→(γ〈dk,ds〉) ≤ 2 log (1 + ), from irreducability of
γ〈dk,ds〉 we have that KD(γ〈dk,ds〉) = log dk, and the
lower bound for V (S) we obtain in the following way:
D(γ〈dk,ds〉) =
KD(γ〈dk,ds〉)
log dk + log ds
=
log dk
log dk + log ds
≤ log dk
log dk + log
dk−1

. (77)
Thus
V (S) ≥Mγ〈dk,ds〉
(
1− log dk
log dk + log
dk−1

)
≈=0 M(γ〈dk,ds〉), (78)
where the first inequality is a consequence of Lemma 1.
uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof partial transpo-
sition Γ and the operation of diag are assumed to be
evaluated in computational basis. Futhermore we assume∥∥AΓ01,10∥∥ ≤ . Using the results in Ref. [24], we know:∣∣∣∣ρ− γ〈2,ds〉∣∣∣∣ ≤  =⇒ ∣∣∣∣AΓ0011∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (79)
We define a projection.
Π := (|00〉 〈00|+ |11〉 〈11|)⊗ Id2s . (80)
Notice that Πγ〈2,ds〉Π = γ〈2,ds〉, and let us define subnor-
malized state
ρΓΠ := Πρ
ΓΠ. (81)
From one of assumptions we have:∥∥ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥ = 2∥∥AΓ01,10∥∥ ≤ 2. (82)
Where diag(·) refers to blocks with respect to key part.
We define a CPTP φ and corresponding Kraus operators.
φ(ρ) : =
2∑
i=1
KiρK
†
i , (83)
K1 := |01〉 〈01| ⊗ Id2s , (84)
K1 := |10〉 〈10| ⊗ Id2s . (85)
We employ the above to upper bound some traces of cer-
tain diagonal block of ρΓ. Since trace norm is contractive
under CPTP maps and for i 6= j we have Xij,ij = 0:
 ≥ ∥∥ρ− γ〈2,ds〉∥∥ ≥ ∥∥φ (ρ)− φ (γ〈2,ds〉)∥∥ (86)
= ‖|01〉 〈01| ⊗A01,01 + |10〉 〈10| ⊗A10,10‖ (87)
= ‖A01,01‖+ ‖A10,10‖ = TrA01,01 + TrA10,10 (88)
= TrAΓ01,01 + TrA
Γ
10,10, (89)
where we used a property that trace of hermitean positive
semidefinite matrix is invariant under partial transpose.
We anticipate now and use equations (86-89) to lower
bound the following quantity.
Tr
(
ΠρΓΠ
)
= TrAΓ00,00 + TrA
Γ
11,11 (90)
= 1− TrAΓ01,01 + TrAΓ10,10 ≥ 1− . (91)
As a byproduct notice that:∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥ = Tr (ρΓΠ) ≡ Tr (ΠρΓΠ) ≥ 1− . (92)
We employ now the ”gentle measurement lemma” [40–
42], saying that for all positive semidefinite operators σ,
and 0 ≤ H ≤ 1 one has:∥∥∥σ −√Hσ√H∥∥∥ ≤ 2√Tr(σ)√Tr (σ(I −H)). (93)
Since Π is a projector, and ρΓ is normalized, from equa-
tions (90-91,93) we find
∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ∥∥ ≤ 2√1− Tr (ΠρΓΠ) ≤ 2√, (94)
where we used cyclic property of trace. Using triangle
inequality twice, the fact that
∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥ ≡ ∥∥diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥, and
inequalities in (82,92,94):∥∥∥∥∥ρΓ − diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥ρΓ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥ (95)
+
∥∥∥∥∥diag (ρΓΠ)− diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ (96)
=
∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ + (ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ))∥∥+ (1− ∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥) (97)
≤ ∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ∥∥+ ∥∥ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥+  (98)
≤ 2√+ 2+  = 2
(√
+
3
2

)
. (99)
From the Ref. [16] and [23] two-way repeater rate is
upper bounded in the following way.
R↔(ρ) ≤ KD
(
ρΓ
) ≤ Er (ρΓ) . (100)
While employing asymptotic continuity of the relative
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entropy of entanglement Er [43, 44], in the form:∣∣∣∣∣Er(ρΓ)− Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ log dimH(ρΓ)
+ (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
) (101)
=⇒ Er(ρΓ) ≤ Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)
+ ξ log dimH(ρ
Γ) + (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
), (102)
where ξ = 2
(√
+ 32
)
. We have now from equation
(100)
R↔(ρ) ≤ Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)
+ ξ log dimH(ρ
Γ) (103)
+ (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
). (104)
Blocks of diag
(
ρΓ
)
are separable by assumption. Since
non-zero blocks of diag
(
ρΓΠ
)
are identical to correspond-
ing blocks of diag
(
ρΓ
)
they are also separable. This
implies that the relative entropy of entanglement of
diag(ρΓΠ)
‖ρΓΠ‖ , from its definition reads 0. Knowing that dk = 2
and that dimension of matrix is invariant under partial
transpose we obtain an upper bound.
R↔(ρ) ≤ 2
(√
+
3
2

)
(1 + log ds) (105)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 3
)
h(
2
√
+ 3
1 + 2
√
+ 3
). (106)
uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 4. We work under assumption that
1
2(ds+1)
≤ ∣∣∣∣ρ− γ〈2,ds〉∣∣∣∣ ≤  < 12 . The first step is to up-
per bound key rate with relative entropy (see Ref. [23]).
KD(ρ) ≤ Er(ρ). (107)
Then we make use of asymptotic continuity of quantum
relative entropy [43, 44].∣∣Er(ρ)− Er(γ〈2,ds〉)∣∣ ≤ 2 log dimH(ρ)
+ (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
) (108)
=⇒ Er(ρ) ≤ Er(γ〈2,ds〉)
+

2
log dimH(ρ) + (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
). (109)
Since Er(γ〈dk,ds〉) ≤ log dk [23], by combining Eq. (107)
and (109), we have:
KD(ρ) ≤ log dk + 
2
log dimH ρ+ (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
).
(110)
From Ref. [24], we know that
∣∣∣∣ρ− γ〈2,ds〉∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12(ds+1) ,
what together with the initial condition ( < 12 ) yields:
log ds ≥ log
(
1− 2
2
)
. (111)
The overhead of the scheme is then lower bounded
V (ρ) = M(ρ)
(
1− K
→
D (ρ)
log dimH(ρ)
)
(112)
≥M(ρ)
1− log dk + 2 log dimH(ρ) + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
log dimH(ρ)

(113)
≥M(ρ)
1− log dk + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
log dk + log
(
1−2
2
) − 
2
 (114)
= M(ρ)
1− 1 + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
1 + log
(
1−2
2
) − 
2
 . (115)
Where we used dimH(ρ) = dimH(γ〈2,ds〉) and dk = 2.
Now we have to place an appropriate lower bound on
KD. Following arguments of Ref. [45] the operation of
privacy squeezing does not increase the trace distance∣∣∣∣∣∣ρps − γps〈2,ds〉∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . Moreover after this operation pri-
vate state (strictly irreducible in that case) turns into
one of the two Bell states γps〈2,ds〉 ≡ ψ. In general the
following inequalities hold
K→D (ρ
ps) ≤ K→D (ρ) ≤ KD(ρ). (116)
On the other hand due to Lemma V.3. in Ref. [46], both
one-way and two-way keys are lower bounded with:
1− 8 log dimH(γps〈2,ds〉)− 4h() ≤ K→D (ρps). (117)
From equations (116), (117), and the fact dimH(ρ
ps) = 2,
we obtain:
KD(ρ) ≥ η := 1− 8− 4h(). (118)
Form the Proposition 1 the rate of the repeater is upper
bounded with:
R↔(ρ) ≤ θ := 2
(√
+
3
2

)
(1 + log ds) (119)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 3
)
h(
2
√
+ 3
1 + 2
√
+ 3
). (120)
uunionsq
Notation 7. We denote Projectors Pi,j and Pi for i 6= j
Pi,j = |ii〉 〈ii|+ |jj〉 〈jj| , (121)
Pi = |ii〉 〈ii| . (122)
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The following identities hold.
Fact 1. We have the following identities:
(Pi,j ⊗ I)
∑
ijkl
|ij〉 〈kl| ⊗Aij,kl
 (Pi,j ⊗ I) (123)
= |ii〉 〈ii| ⊗Aii,ii + |ii〉 〈jj| ⊗Aii,jj (124)
+ |jj〉 〈ii| ⊗Ajj,ii + |jj〉 〈jj| ⊗Ajj,jj , (125)
and also
(Pi ⊗ I)
∑
ijkl
|ij〉 〈kl| ⊗Aij,kl
 (Pi ⊗ I) (126)
= |ii〉 〈ii| ⊗Aii,ii. (127)
Notation 8. For the proves of Observations 4 and 4 we
abuse the notation denoting 1dkXii,jj → Xii,jj, Pi,j⊗I →
Pi,j and Pi ⊗ I → Pi for conciseness.
Proof of Observation 4. We start with proving first
inequality (38). Using the contractivity of the trace norm
we have
‖ρ− γ‖ ≤  =⇒ ‖Pi,jρPi,j − Pi,jγPi,j‖ ≤ . (128)
Thus,
|| |ii〉 〈ii| ⊗ (Aii,ii −Xii,ii)+ (129)
|ii〉 〈jj| ⊗ (Aii,jj −Xii,jj) (130)
+ |jj〉 〈ii| ⊗ (Ajj,ii −Xjj,ii)
+ |jj〉 〈jj| ⊗ (Ajj,jj −Xjj,jj)|| ≤ . (131)
Using again the norm contractivity property and pro-
jector Pi we have
 ≥ ‖ρ− γ‖ ≥ ‖PiρPi − PiγPi‖ (132)
=
∑
i
‖Aii,ii −Xii,ii‖ ≥ ‖Aii,ii −Xii,ii‖. (133)
Now we want to prove that
‖Aii,jj −Xii,jj‖ ≤ . (134)
Let us express the matrix from LHS of (131) as follows
M = D + Aˆ, (135)
where M is a matrix, D are diagonal elements and Aˆ are
anti-diagonal elements. Note that ||D|| ≤  as ||M || ≤ .
We get then
‖M‖ =
∥∥∥D + Aˆ∥∥∥ ≥ ∣∣∣‖D‖ − ∥∥∥Aˆ∥∥∥∣∣∣ (136)
=⇒
∥∥∥Aˆ∥∥∥ ≤ ‖M‖+ ‖D‖ ≤ ‖M‖+  ≤ 2. (137)
We note then, that∥∥∥Aˆ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∥ 0 Aˆii,jjAˆ†ii,jj 0
∥∥∥∥∥ = 2∥∥∥Aˆii,jj∥∥∥,
hence ∥∥∥Aˆ∥∥∥ = 2‖Aii,jj −Xii,jj‖ ≤ 2, (138)
‖Aii,jj −Xii,jj‖ ≤ . (139)
Finally, applying the reverse triangle inequality to equa-
tion (139), and having ‖Xii,jj‖ = 1dk .∣∣∣∣‖Aii,jj‖ − 1dk
∣∣∣∣ ≤  =⇒ ‖Aii,jj‖ ≥ 1dk − . (140)
Now we prove the second inequality (39). Consider an
incomplete von Neumann measurement
{Kij} = {|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗ I}. (141)
Using ‖ρ− γ‖ ≤  and contractivity of norm we obtain∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
ij
KijρK
†
ij −
∑
ij
KijγK
†
ij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ , (142)∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
ij
|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗Aij,ij −
∑
i
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗Xii,ii
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ . (143)
For i 6= j let Xij,ij = 0, then∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
ij
|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗Aij,ij −
∑
ij
|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗Xij,ij
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ , (144)
∑
ij
‖|ij〉 〈ij| ⊗ (Aij,ij −Xij,ij)‖ ≤ . (145)
∑
i6=j
‖Aij,ij −Xij,ij‖+
∑
i
‖Aii,ii −Xii,ii‖ ≤ . (146)
Employing aforementioned condition that Xij,ij van-
ish, and non-negativity of trace norm we obtain.∑
i 6=j
‖Aij,ij‖ ≤ . (147)
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 2. We know that ρΓ ≥ 0. Firstly we
construct, a projector on certain 2× ds dimensional sub-
space of ρΓ ≥ 0.
Π0 = (|ij〉 〈ij|+ |ji〉 〈ji|)⊗ Id2s , i 6= j. (148)
Having in mind that ρ =
∑
ijjkl |ij〉 〈kl| ⊗ Aij,kl we per-
form the projection and obtain
Π0ρ
ΓΠ0 =

AΓij,ij 0 0 A
Γ
ii,jj
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
AΓii,jj
†
0 0 AΓji,ji
 ≥ 0. (149)
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where we used that AΓjj,ii = A
Γ
ii,jj
†
, what is a conse-
quence of ρΓ being hermitean. Indeed Π0ρ
ΓΠ0 is posi-
tive semidefinite since Π0 is a Kraus operator. In what
follows we construct a unitary transformation based on
singular value decomposition of AΓii,jj = SΣV .
U = |ij〉 〈ij| ⊗ S† + |ji〉 〈ji| ⊗ V, (150)
Note that TrΣ =
∥∥AΓii,jj∥∥. In the next step we perform
specific privacy squeezing operation on ρΓ.
ρΓps. = TrA′B′UΠ0ρ
ΓΠ0U
†. (151)
What yields following form of a squeezed matrix, that is
positive semidefinite.
ρΓps. =

‖Aij,ij‖ 0 0
∥∥AΓii,jj∥∥
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0∥∥AΓii,jj∥∥ 0 0 ‖Aji,ji‖
 ≥ 0. (152)
Where we used a property of diagonal blocks ||Aij,ij || =
TrAij,ij = TrA
Γ
ij,ij = ||AΓij,ij ||. Using a basic fact known
for positive matrices we have the following dependence
between its entries:∥∥AΓii,jj∥∥ ≤ ‖Aij,ij‖+ ‖Aji,ji‖2 . (153)
Now we are going to use Observation 4. The smallest
component of the sum is always smaller than an average
we have:
2 ≥ 2
∑
i 6=j
‖Aij,ij‖ =
∑
i6=j
(‖Aij,ij‖+ ‖Aji,ji‖) (154)
= dk(dk − 1)
∑
i 6=j
(‖Aij,ij‖+ ‖Aji,ji‖)
dk(dk − 1) (155)
≥ dk(dk − 1) min
i6=j
(‖Aij,ij‖+ ‖Aji,ji‖) . (156)
Since equation (153) is true for all i 6= j, we use the
smallest element denoted with i0 6= j0. Hence form (153):∥∥AΓi0i0,j0j0∥∥ ≤ dk(dk − 1) . (157)
By Observation 4, ∀i 6=j we have ‖Aii,jj‖ ≥ 1dk −  and∥∥AΓi0i0,j0j0∥∥ ≤ d2k−dk . Owing to the fact that under par-
tial transposition the trace norm can not increase by
more than the dimension of the matrix (here ds) [24],
we have:
1
dk
−  ≤ ‖Ai0i0,j0j0‖ ≤ ds
∥∥AΓi0i0,j0j0∥∥ ≤ d2k − dk ds,
(158)
thus:
1− dk ≤ dk
d2k − dk
ds =

dk − 1ds, (159)
and finally:
ds ≥
(
dk − 1

)
(1− dk). (160)
uunionsq
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof is straightforward
consequence of Lemma 2. Since the implication stated
in Lemma 2 is true for any  that  ≥ ‖ρ− γ‖, we denote
with 0 the one that saturates it. We have the following
implication.
||ρ− γdk,ds || = 0 ⇒ ds ≥
(
dk − 1
0
)
(1− 0dk). (161)
We immediately obtain the following lower bound:
||ρ− γdk,ds || ≥
dk − 1
ds + dk (dk − 1) . (162)
uunionsq
Proof of Corollary 3. We notice that equation (157) is
true also for dk = 2. Since in this dimension there is only
a single choice of i0 6= j0 (up to hermitean conjugate),
we have: ∥∥AΓ00,11∥∥ ≤ dk(dk − 1) = 2 . (163)
uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof follows the same
steps as proof of Proposition 1. Partial transposition Γ
and the operation of diag(·) are assumed to be evaluated
in computational basis. Futhermore we assume that∑
i 6=j
∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤ . We work under an assumption
that dk−1ds+dk(dk−1) ≤
∣∣∣∣ρ− γ〈dk,ds〉∣∣∣∣ ≤  < 1dk and
dimH ρ =
1
2 dim ρ.
We define a projection, and subnormalized state ρΓΠ,
Π :=
dk−1∑
i=0
|ii〉 〈ii| ⊗ Id2s , (164)
ρΓΠ := Πρ
ΓΠ. (165)
We notice then that:∥∥ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥ = ∑
i 6=j
∥∥AΓij,ji∥∥ ≤ , (166)
where diag(·) refers to blocks with respect to key part.
We anticipate now and calculate the following quantity
using equation (147) again:
Tr
(
ΠρΓΠ
)
=
dk−1∑
i=0
AΓii,ii (167)
=
dk−1∑
i=0
Aii,ii = 1−
∑
i 6=j
Aij,ij ≥ 1− . (168)
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As a byproduct we notice that:∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥ = Tr (ρΓΠ) = Tr (ΠρΓΠ) ≥ 1− . (169)
We employ now the ”gentle measurement lemma” [40–
42], saying that for all positive semidefinite operators σ,
and 0 ≤ H ≤ 1 one has:∥∥∥σ −√Hσ√H∥∥∥ ≤ 2√Tr(σ)√Tr (σ(I −H)). (170)
Since Π is a projector, and ρΓ is normalized, from equa-
tions (167-168,170) we find∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ∥∥ ≤ 2√1− Tr (ΠρΓΠ) ≤ 2√, (171)
where we used cyclic property of trace. Using triangle
inequality twice, the fact that
∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥ ≡ ∥∥diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥, and
inequalities in equations (166), (169), (171):∥∥∥∥∥ρΓ − diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥ρΓ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥ (172)
+
∥∥∥∥∥diag (ρΓΠ)− diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥ (173)
=
∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ + (ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ))∥∥+ (1− ∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥) (174)
≤ ∥∥ρΓ − ρΓΠ∥∥+ ∥∥ρΓΠ − diag (ρΓΠ)∥∥+  (175)
≤ 2√+ +  = 2 (√+ ) . (176)
This upper bound is tighter than the corresponding one
for a pbit from Proposition 1 due to application of Corol-
lary 3. This is due to using partial results form Lemma
2.
From the Ref. [16] and [23] two-way repeater rate is
upper bounded in the following way.
R↔(ρ) ≤ KD
(
ρΓ
) ≤ Er (ρΓ) . (177)
While employing asymptotic continuity of the relative
entropy of entanglement Er [43, 44], in the form:∣∣∣∣∣Er(ρΓ)− Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ log dimH(ρΓ)
+ (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
) (178)
=⇒ Er(ρΓ) ≤ Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)
+ ξ log dimH(ρ
Γ) + (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
), (179)
where ξ = 2 (
√
+ ). Since dimension of a matrix is
invariant under partial transpose we have now:
R↔(ρ) ≤ Er
(
diag
(
ρΓΠ
)∥∥ρΓΠ∥∥
)
+ ξ log dimH(ρ) (180)
+ (1 + ξ)h(
ξ
1 + ξ
). (181)
Blocks of diag
(
ρΓ
)
are separable from assumption. Since
non-zero blocks diag
(
ρΓΠ
)
are identical to corresponding
blocks of diag
(
ρΓ
)
they are also separable. This implies
that the relative entropy of entanglement of
diag(ρΓΠ)
‖ρΓΠ‖ ,
from its definition reads 0.
R↔(ρ) ≤ 2 (√+ ) dimH(ρ) (182)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 2
)
h(
√
+ 
1
2 +
√
+ 
). (183)
uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 5. We work under assumption that
dk−1
ds+dk(dk−1) ≤
∣∣∣∣ρ− γ〈dk,ds〉∣∣∣∣ ≤  < 1dk .
The first step is to upper bound key rate with relative
entropy (see Ref. [23]).
KD(ρ) ≤ Er(ρ). (184)
Then we make use of asymptotic continuity of quantum
relative entropy [43, 44].∣∣Er(ρ)− Er(γ〈dk,ds〉)∣∣ ≤ 2 log dimH(ρ)
+ (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
) (185)
=⇒ Er(ρ) ≤ Er(γ〈dk,ds〉) +

2
log dimH(ρ)
+ (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
). (186)
Since Er(γ〈dk,ds〉) ≤ log dk [23], by combining Eq. (184)
and (186),we have:
KD(ρ) ≤ log dk + 
2
log dimH ρ+ (1 +

2
)h(

2
1 + 2
).
(187)
From Lemma 2, we know that ds ≥
(
dk−1

)
(1 − dk),
we assume RHS to be positive, what together with the
initial condition yields:
log ds ≥ log
(
dk − 1

)
+ log(1− dk). (188)
The overhead of the scheme is then lower bounded
V (ρ) = M(ρ)
(
1− KD(ρ)
log dimH(ρ)
)
(189)
≥M(ρ)
1− log dk + 2 log dimH(ρ) + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
log dimH(ρ)

(190)
= M(ρ)
1− log dk + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
log dk + log ds
− 
2
 (191)
≥M(ρ)
1− log dk + (1 + 2 )h( 21+ 2 )
log dk + log
(
dk−1

)
+ log(1− dk)
− 
2
 .
(192)
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Now we have to an appropriate lower bound on KD.
Following arguments of Ref. [45] the operation of pri-
vacy squeezing does not increase the trace distance∣∣∣∣∣∣ρps − γps〈dk,ds〉∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ , and the key rate K→D (ρps) ≤
K→D (ρ). Moreover after this operation private state
(strictly irreducible in that case) turns into maximally
entangled state of dimension d2k.
K→D (ρ
ps) ≤ K→D (ρ) ≤ KD(ρ). (193)
On the other hand due to results in Ref. [46], and the
fact that K→D (ρ
ps) = log dimH(ρ
ps) both one-way and
two-way keys are lower bounded
log dk − 8 log dimH(γps〈dk,ds〉)− 4h() ≤ K→D (ρps).
(194)
From Eq. 193, 194, and the fact dimH(γ
ps
〈dk,ds〉) = dk, we
obtain:
KD(ρ) ≥ η := log dk − 8 log dk − 4h(). (195)
Form the Proposition 2 the rate of the repeater is upper
bounded with:
R↔(ρ) ≤ θ := 2 (√+ )dimH(ρ) (196)
+
(
1 + 2
√
+ 2
)
h(
√
+ 
1
2 +
√
+ 
). (197)
uunionsq
